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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 










KEVIN ALAN BONNER, 
   Appellant 
______________ 
 
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA 
(D.C. No. 2-05-cr-00069-001) 
District Judge: Hon. Arthur J. Schwab 
______________ 
 
Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
November 15, 2013 
______________ 
 
Before: HARDIMAN, SHWARTZ, and SCIRICA, Circuit Judges. 
 






SHWARTZ, Circuit Judge. 
 
 Kevin Bonner appeals the District Court’s order denying his motion for a 
reduction of his sentence under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2).  He contends he is entitled to a 
downward adjustment based on Amendment 706 to the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines.  
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Because he was not sentenced based on the guideline governed by Amendment 706, he is 
not entitled to such a reduction and we will therefore affirm. 
I. 
As we write principally for the benefit of the parties, we recite only the essential 
facts and procedural history.  Local police officers arrested Bonner after receiving a tip 
stating that he had been selling crack cocaine at a bar and subsequently discovering crack 
cocaine, powder cocaine, and $2,207 in Bonner’s pockets.  Presentence Investigation 
Report (“P.S.R.”) ¶ 5.  A grand jury returned a one-count indictment against Bonner, 
charging him with possession with intent to distribute five grams or more of cocaine base 
in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) and (b)(1)(B).  P.S.R. ¶ 2.  Bonner pleaded guilty.  
P.S.R. ¶ 4. 
Using the 2005 edition of the Sentencing Guidelines Manual,
1
 the Probation 
Office examined the Drug Quantity Table under U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(c)(7) and Bonner’s 
criminal history and determined that he qualified as a “career offender” under U.S.S.G. § 
4B1.1.  P.S.R. ¶¶ 10-19.  Because of his “career offender” status, Bonner’s Guidelines 
imprisonment range was 262 to 327 months.
2
  The District Court found that Bonner’s 
career offender status “somewhat exaggerate[d] his criminal history,” granted a 
                                                 
1
 The parties disagree about which Guidelines manual governs Bonner’s sentence, 
but this appeal is not affected by this issue. 
2
 In the absence of the “career offender” designation, Bonner’s Guidelines range 
would have been 84 to 105 months, but because of the amount of crack cocaine involved, 
he faced a statutory mandatory minimum of 120 months’ imprisonment.  P.S.R. ¶¶ 18, 
31; see U.S.S.G. § 5A. 
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downward departure, and sentenced Bonner to a prison term of 180 months, which it 
noted was “substantially below the minimum provided for in the guidelines.”  App. 80-
81.  We affirmed that sentence.  United States v. Bonner, 238 F. App’x 871 (3d Cir. 
2007) (not precedential).  On October 28, 2011, Bonner moved to reduce his sentence 
under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2) in light of the Sentencing Commission’s retroactive 
reduction of the crack cocaine-related base offense levels.  See U.S.S.G. app. C, amend. 
706 (Nov. 1, 2007); U.S.S.G. app. C, amend. 713 (May 1, 2008).  The District Court 
denied that motion and this appeal followed. 
II. 
 The District Court had jurisdiction pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3231.  We exercise 
jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  Our review of the District Court’s 
determination concerning Bonner’s ineligibility for a sentence reduction under 18 U.S.C. 
§ 3582(c)(2) and its interpretation of the Sentencing Guidelines is de novo.  United States 
v. Flemming (Flemming II), 617 F.3d 252, 257 (3d Cir. 2010). 
III. 
 A district court generally cannot “modify a term of imprisonment once it has been 
imposed” unless a defendant is eligible for a reduction pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c).  
Section 3582(c)(2)
 3
 allows for a reduction if: (1) the sentence was “based on a sentencing 
                                                 
3
 The full text of 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2) provides that “in the case of a defendant 
who has been sentenced to a term of imprisonment based on a sentencing range that has 
subsequently been lowered by the Sentencing Commission pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 994(o), 
upon motion of the defendant or the Director of the Bureau of Prisons, or on its own 
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range that has subsequently been lowered by the Sentencing Commission”; and (2) “a 
reduction is consistent with applicable policy statements issued by the Sentencing 
Commission.”  18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2); United States v. Flemming (Flemming III), 723 
F.3d 407, 410 (3d Cir. 2013); Flemming II, 617 F.3d at 257.  Bonner satisfies neither 
criterion. 
A. 
 In support of his request for a sentence reduction, Bonner relies on Amendment 
706, which generally reduced by two the base offense levels for crack cocaine offenses 
under § 2D1.1.  U.S.S.G. app. C, amend. 706 (Nov. 1, 2007); see United States v. Mateo, 
560 F.3d 152, 154 (3d Cir. 2009).  Bonner’s sentence, however, was not based upon § 
2D1.1.  Rather, Bonner was sentenced based on the career offender guideline set forth in 
§ 4B1.1.  App. 3 (“Here, Defendant’s initial sentence was ‘based on’ a sentencing range 
reflecting his status as a ‘career offender’ and not based upon the guidelines that were 
subsequently modified to reflect the disparity between crack and powder cocaine.” 
(emphasis in original)).
4
  The District Court’s focus at sentencing was on Bonner’s actual 
                                                                                                                                                             
motion, the court may reduce the term of imprisonment, after considering the factors set 
forth in section 3553(a) to the extent that they are applicable, if such a reduction is 
consistent with applicable policy statements issued by the Sentencing Commission.” 
4
 By contrast, in United States v. Stratton, No. 99-326, 2009 WL 506365 (E.D. Pa. 
Feb. 27, 2009), a case on which Bonner relies, the District Court determined that its 
sentence had been “based on” § 2D1.1 only after explicitly stating that it had looked to 
and relied on § 2D1.1 in determining the extent of its departure downward from the § 
4B1.1 career offender range.  Id., at *5.  As more fully explained in Part II.B., however, 
the Stratton court may have reached a different conclusion if Amendment 759 to the 
Sentencing Guidelines had existed at the time of Stratton’s sentencing. 
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criminal history and its interplay with a strict application of § 4B1.1’s career offender 
guideline, not U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1.
5
  A crack cocaine offender, like Bonner, whose sentence 
is determined based upon § 4B1.1 is not one whose sentencing range is based on or 
subsequently lowered by Amendment 706.  Mateo, 560 F.3d at 155.  Because Bonner 
was not sentenced based upon a subsequently lowered sentencing guideline, he fails to 




Bonner also fails to meet § 3582(c)(2)’s second criterion, as a reduction in his 
sentence would not be “consistent with applicable policy statements issued by the 
Sentencing Commission.”  The relevant “applicable policy statement[]” makes clear that 
a reduction in a sentence following a retroactive Guidelines amendment is inconsistent 
with the Commission’s policy statements unless the amendment has “the effect of 
lowering the defendant’s applicable guideline range.”  U.S.S.G. § 1B1.10(a)(2)(B).  
Thus, the “question here is whether amendments to the . . . guidelines . . . have the effect 
of lowering the ‘applicable guideline range’ of a defendant subject to the career offender 
                                                 
5
 Although the court referred to the 100-to-1 crack-to-powder cocaine disparity in 
its Tentative Findings and at sentencing it noted that the 180-month sentence it imposed 
was “obviously 60 months greater than the [120-month] statutory minimum” Bonner 
faced, App. 81, neither statement demonstrates that § 2D1.1 was the basis for the District 
Court’s sentence. 
6
 Contrary to Bonner’s arguments, Freeman v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 2685 
(2011), does not affect the analysis.  Justice Sotomayor’s concurring opinion, which this 
Court has held is controlling, does not change the fact that “[t]o meet the first condition 
of § 3582(c)(2), a defendant’s sentence must be based on the actual, calculated 
Guidelines range upon which the district court relied at sentencing.”  United States v. 
Thompson, 682 F.3d 285, 290 (3d Cir. 2012). 
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designation, but who received a downward departure . . . .”  Flemming III, 723 F.3d at 
410. 
Amendment 759 defines “applicable guideline range” as “the guideline range that 
corresponds to the offense level and criminal history category determined pursuant to § 
1B1.1(a), which is determined before consideration of any departure provision in the 
Guidelines Manual or any variance.”  U.S.S.G. § 1B1.10 cmt. n.1(A); see U.S.S.G. app. 
C, amend. 759 (Nov. 1, 2011); see also U.S.S.G. § 1B1.10 cmt. n.6 (requiring courts to 
“use the version of this policy statement that is in effect on the date on which the court 
reduces the defendant’s term of imprisonment as provided by 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2)”).  
As in Flemming III, “the ‘applicable guideline range’ . . . [for Bonner] is the range 
calculated pursuant to the career offender designation of § 4B1.1, and not the range 
calculated after applying any departure or variance.”  723 F.3d at 412.  The fact that 
Bonner received a downward departure from the applicable career offender guideline 
does not change the sentencing guideline under which his sentence was calculated.  See 
id. 
In short, the amendments to the Sentencing Guidelines that lowered the crack 
cocaine range did not have “the effect of lowering [Bonner’s] applicable guideline 
range,” Mateo, 560 F.3d at 155, because Bonner’s “applicable guideline range” was the 
range set by the career offender guideline, § 4B1.1, prior to any departure or variance.  




 For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the District Court’s denial of Bonner’s 
motion for a reduction of his sentence under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2). 
